In his first public statement regarding Israel’s conflict with Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah recently conveyed that while the group supported Hamas’ attack on Israel, it would not immediately initiate another front in the war. Hezbollah has engaged in cross-border firefights with Israel since the attack on October 7th; however, this is not uncommon as low-level conflict often occurs along the Blue Line, which separates Lebanon and Israel. The region’s proximity to the conflict and Hezbollah’s close ties with Iran make it a potential area for further escalation. Lebanon is not the only location at risk of spillover conflict, as Iran-backed militias have been targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria, launching numerous attacks on US bases since October 17th. In addition, the Houthis, another Iran-backed group controlling parts of southern Yemen, have launched missiles and drones toward Israel. Nonetheless, these have been intercepted by US warships and Israeli defense systems. Iran tends to activate its proxy groups to fight and die on its behalf, and it provides funding and resources to various groups along a spectrum, with Hezbollah being one of Iran’s closest allies. Nasrallah and the Iranian leadership have praised the attack by Hamas and threatened retaliation against Israel. However, it remains unclear when or if they will escalate their involvement. All these groups allow Iran to send messages to its adversaries, the US and Israel, while maintaining plausible deniability. Nevertheless, this tactic carries risks, especially given the absence of direct diplomatic channels between the adversaries. There are two ways the conflict could escalate: by calculation or miscalculation. While Iran is unlikely to directly attack Israel or the US, an error or excessive action by Iran or its proxies could result in broader conflict. Hezbollah has previously fought against Israel and has enhanced its capabilities over time. Nasrallah claims the group has 100,000 fighters, many of whom have gained experience supporting Syrian forces. Hezbollah also possesses a considerable arsenal of rockets and missiles, including Iranian models with longer ranges. It can also convert older rockets into precision-guided missiles. Hezbollah also holds significant political power in Lebanon, where a war would be highly unpopular. The group’s actions are aligned with Iran’s interests, and Iran will utilize Hezbollah when necessary, regardless of Lebanon’s well-being. While Hezbollah has a larger ground force than Hamas, it would face considerable opposition from Israel’s well-prepared troops. Iran likely believes that Hezbollah’s expanded arsenal is sufficient to deter significant action from Israel in Lebanon. Hamas officials have met with Hezbollah leaders and encouraged their support, although the extent of Hezbollah’s involvement will depend on Iran’s decisions. Peripheral groups aligned with Iran, such as proxy groups in Iraq and Syria, also pose a risk. The US has carried out airstrikes against these groups since renewed attacks on US installations began on October 17th. However, these actions, together with missiles launched by the Houthis toward Israel, are more likely signals of Iran’s dissatisfaction with Israel and the US, rather than an immediate escalation. A network of Iranian-controlled groups in Iraq directs front groups responsible for rocket attacks on US bases. These groups have been carrying out attacks since 2020 and are trusted allies of Iran.